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1956] CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Joseph Dainow*
DOMICILE
Successions of Rhea' involved a question of inheritance tax-
ation. If decedents' domicile had been in Louisiana, the tax
would be about $167,000, but if their domicile had been in
Tennessee, the tax would be only a little over $1,000. The evi-
dence concerning the domiciliary intent of the parties was con-
flicting, for although they moved their residence and personal
life completely out of Louisiana and into Tennessee, certain busi-
ness interests were preserved in Louisiana. In addition, they
filed their federal income tax returns in Louisiana, purchased
some of their automobile licenses in Louisiana, and so forth.
Following principles of domicile that are well established in Lou-
isiana, and giving more weight to acts and conduct than to
words and statements, the court found their domicile to have
been in Tennessee. The decedents had only one residence; it
was in Tennessee and that was their principal establishment.
The fact that they may have entertained a floating intention to
return to Louisaina at some future date was treated by the
court as immaterial. This decision lost a substantial sum of
money to the state coffers, but it was the right conclusion to
reach. Furthermore, it emphasizes that people cannot determine
at will the place of their domicile unless this also corresponds
with the actual state of facts.
In the case of Juneau v. Juneau2 a separation suit was in-
stituted by the husband, and by reconventional demand the wife
asked for recognition of a Nevada divorce which she had ob-
tained. The court refused to give full faith and credit to the
Nevada decree on the ground that there had been no divorce
jurisdiction, 3 because the evidence contradicted any bona fide
domicile by the wife in Nevada. In the fall of 1952, a divorce
suit had been instituted in Louisiana, but it was dismissed by
consent on January 30, 1953. The following day, the wife left
for Nevada and there obtained a divorce on April 9, 1953. Her
absence from Louisiana consisted of two weeks vacation (with
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 227 La. 214, 78 So.2d 838 (1955).
2. 227 La. 921, 80 So.2d 864 (1955).
0. Williams v. North Carolina I1, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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pay) from her job, together with a leave of absence during"part
of which she worked for the same company in its Houston,
Texas, office. A few weeks after her divorce in Nevada, she was
back in her former employ in New Orleans.
On the facts of this case, the conclusion that a domicile had
not been established in Nevada is almost inescapable 4-- despite
Justice Hamiter's dissent on the ground that the record did not
affirmatively rebut the presumption that the Nevada court had
jurisdiction-and this would be so regardless of whether the
Nevada plaintiff had been the wife or the husband. In such
event, the discussion in the majority opinion about the domicile of
a married woman being that of the husband might be considered
as dictum. Nevertheless, some comment should be addressed to it.
To begin with, a distinction must be drawn between the Lou-
isiana rules concerning domicile for (1) matters which are
purely local, that is, intrastate or limited in all aspects within
the territorial boundaries of Louisiana, and (2) other matters
which are interstate in character by reason of revelant elements
which are connected with other states. For the former situation,
there is no question (within due process) that Louisiana can
establish its own rules concerning domicile in general and gov-
erning the domicile of married women in particular. For the
latter, it is likewise within the competence of Louisiana to estab-
lish rules of domicile, but in a case which involves a full faith
and credit issue, these Louisiana rules of domicile and the method
of their application (for interstate purposes) may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court of the United States.5
In this respect, therefore, it would be preferable for the Lou-
isiana rules to be in line with the rules generally recognized by
the other states and by the United States Supreme Court. Ac-
cordingly, there should be a re-examination of this question and
a reconsideration of the issue before relying in a conflict of
4. Although in effect at the time of the events in this case, no mention is
made of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, which was passed as Act 241 of
1952 and became LA. R.S. 9:351-354 (1950) -perhaps because it was repealed
in 1954. Under LA. R.S. 9:352-353 (1950), the divorce in this case would not
have been entitled to recognition.
5. Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 874 (1949): "It is not for us to retry the facts,
and we cannot say that in reaching their conclusion the [Connecticut] courts did
not have warrant in evidence and did not fairly weigh the facts," quoting from
Esenwein v. Commonwealth em rel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279, 281 (1945). See also
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873), that a recital of juris-
dictional facts in the record is not conclusive.
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laws (interstate) case upon the Louisiana local (intrastate)
rules that a married woman has no other domicile than that of
her husband, O and that suits between spouses for divorce or
separation must be brought at the matrimonial domicile estab-
lished for them by the husband ;7 the limited exception being
that a married woman may establish a separate domicile in the
event that her husband's conduct has been such as would furnish
lawful grounds for divorce. 8 The other states and the United
States Supreme Court have been much more liberal in this re-
gard ;9 furthermore, it would also be more in keeping with the
Louisiana emancipatory acts which purported to give married
women an equality of legal status more than a quarter of a cen-
tury ago.10
DIVORCE
The question of giving full faith and credit to an Arkansas
divorce was presented in the case of Eaton v. Eaton." The hus-
band interposed this Arkansas decree as a bar to his wife's
present suit for divorce in Louisiana. The court held that the
Arkansas decree was not entitled to full faith and credit, and
affirmed the lower court's judgment granting a divorce to the
wife. This decision involved two issues. The first one was that
from the dates on which the evidence established the husband's
presence in Louisiana, he could not have had the required resi-
dence in Arkansas to obtain a valid divorce there-much less,
satisfy the requirements for domicile as a basis for divorce juris-
diction in the interstate sense.
The second issue was the more interesting one. In order to
facilitate the procurement of the Arkansas divorce, the husband
had obtained from his wife (while she was visiting the husband's
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 39 (1870).
7. Zinko v. Zinko, 204 La. 478, 15 So.2d 859 (1943), quoted with approval in
Juneau v. Juneau, 227 La. 921, 927, 80 So.2d 864 (1955).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAwS § 28 (Supp. 1948): "If a wife lives
apart from her husband, she can have a separate domicile." This new text is ex-
plained by the following Reason for Change: "Decisions since the publication of
the Restatement [1934] indicate the continuance of growth of the idea that
women's legal emancipation includes the ability to acquire a domicile of choice."
See also GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 79-82 (3d ed. 1949) ; STUMBERG, PIN-
CIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 40-45 (2d ed. 1951) ; 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 403 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina 1, 317
U.S. 287 (1942); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Cook v. Cook, 342
U.S. 126 (1951); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
10. LA. R.S. 9:51, 101-105 (1950).
11. 227 La. 992, 81 So.2d 371 (1955).
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sister in California) a signed instrument entitled "Waiver of
Summons and Entry of Appearance." On the basis of the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in the Sherrer and Coe cases,
12
the husband contended that the Arkansas court's finding of juris-
diction was res judicata and that the divorce decree must there-
fore be recognized. The outcome of this issue depended upon the
meaning and procedural significance of the signed waiver, and
the solution was apparently reached by reference to Louisiana's
(conflict of laws, or interstate) concepts rather than those of
Arkansas, where it was used. No reference was made to the
question of whether such a signed waiver would result in res
judicata if the issue were raised in Arkansas, although from the
point of view of full faith and credit in Louisiana, this point
would not be conclusive.
In evaluating the waiver in the present case, the court found
that (1) the wife had not filed it in the divorce proceedings but
had merely sent it to her husband, (2) she had not made any
personal or attorney appearance in the suit, and (3) she had
not been served with process in Arkansas. This amounts to
saying that she was not in court. Accordingly, the Sherrer and
Coe cases were distinguished on that ground, as well as on the
plaintiff's establishment of the actual residence requirements
in each of these cases. Thus, it cannot be said in the present case
that the questions of the husband's residence and the court's
jurisdiction had been litigated or that the wife had participated
in the proceedings without availing herself of the opportunity to
raise the jurisdictional issue.
In addition to denying recognition to the Arkansas divorce,
the court had to dismiss a contention of estoppel which was urged
against the wife because she accepted six monthly payments of
$100 each pursuant to the husband's agreement when she signed
the waiver. The court did not consider this of any consequence
because the husband was not doing anything more than ful-
filling an existing alimentary obligation to his wife. The hus-
band's apparent fraud in procuring what amounted to a "mail-
order" divorce, and his lack of domicile in Arkansas, were cer-
tainly good reasons for refusing to recognize the decree; the
interpretation of the waiver as not constituting a submission to
the jurisdiction of the court is a less reassuring factor.
12. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
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